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ALIENS - NATURALIZATION - REFUSAL TO BEAR AR.Ms - In applying
for citizenship, petitioner, a licensed missionary in the denomination of Seventh
Day Adventists, was unwilling to promise to bear arms, on the ground that she
was a noncombatant. Petitioner was not a pacifist or conscientious objector and
would gladly do any war work in an army camp except that involving the use of
a weapon. Held, that application for naturalization must be denied for failure
to take the oath of allegiance in the form prescribed by law. The court expressed its desire to grant citizenship, but declared itself bound by stare decisis.1
In re Losey, (D. C. Wash. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 37·
It is well settled that Congress may constitutionally require citizens to bear
arms for their country, regardless of any religious scruples of such citizens.2
Similarly it may deny citizenship to aliens who are unwilling to promise to bear
weapons for the United States.8 The crucial problem in this case is whether
the terms of the naturalization oath ' are to be interpreted as requiring a promise

1 In the following cases citizenship was denied an applicant who would not
promise to bear arms: because she was an uncompromising pacifist with no sense of
nationality other than a "cosmic consciousness of belonging to the human family,"
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 49 S. Ct. 448 (1928); because he
wished to -determine for himself the justice of the cause for which the nation was
fighting, United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 51 S. Ct. 570 (1931); and
because she wished to amend the oath by adding "as far as my conscience as a Christian
will allow," United States v. Bland, 283 U. S. 636, 51 S. Ct. 569 (1931). Justices
Holmes, Brandeis and Sanford dissented in the first of these cases, as did Justices
Hughes, Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo in the latter two.
2 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159 (1918).
8 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 49 S. Ct. 448 (1928); United
States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 51 S. Ct. 570 (1931); United States v. Bland,
283 U.S. 636, 51 S. Ct. 569 (1931). Even the dissenting opinions in these cases grant
that Congress possesses this power.
'34 Stat. L. 597 (1906), 8 U.S. C. (1934), §§ 381, 382.
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to bear arms. 5 This oath, to "support and defend the Constitution and laws of
the United States against all enemies ••• and bear true faith and allegiance to
the same," 6 is substantially the same as the oath required to be taken by civil
officers generally,7 which has never been administered as a positive promise to
bear arms. 8 But even if the office holder's oath requires no such promise, it
does not follow that an alien's oath should be similarly interpreted, particularly
since there is greater need for such a promise by an alien in order to make certain that he will support the United States unequivocally even against the nation
of his former allegiance. 9 Further, the oath of office, unlike the alien's oath,
relates only to the proper discharge of duties of the office, not to all the officer's
duties as a citizen of the United States. Finally, the Naturalization Act contains
an added requirement that the oath-taker must have "behaved as a man • • •
attached to the principles of the Constitution ••• and well disposed to the good
5
It is surprising that while Justices Holmes and Hughes, dissenting in the
Schwimmer and Macintosh cases and admitting the problem to be one of mere statutory
construction, deal almost wholly in their arguments with the merits of legislation which
excludes aliens "because they believe more than some of us do in the teachings of the
Sermon on the Mount." United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 at 655, 49 S. Ct.
448 (1928). Justice Holmes, in praising Mrs. Schwimmer's desire to make the world
more perfect and change existing laws, neglects to point out that what she was doing
was not merely opposing draft legislation but rather refusing in advance to obey such
a law when enacted. Congress has expressly exempted conscientious objectors from
combatant service in the Selective Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. L. 889 (1940), 50
U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1941), Appendix 5, § 5 (g), as in all past draft legislation. I Stat.
L. 271 (1792); 3 Stat. L. 134 (1814); 12 Stat. L. 597 (1862); 12 Stat. L. 731
(1863); 40 Stat. L. 76 (1917). Twenty-two state constitutions provide similar
exemptions. See Macintosh v. United States, (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) 42 F. (2d) 845.
But since only those opposed to war "in any form"-i.e., to all war-are excused,
Professor Macintosh and Miss Bland would not be classified as conscientious objectors.
Since, also, the 1917 Selective Service Act does not exempt all conscientious objectors
but only those who are members of a well-recognized religious sect which opposes war,
neither Mrs. Schwimmer, Professor Macintosh nor Miss Bland would be exempted from
combatant service. But the 1941 Selective Service Act does not make any such distinction. See Wigmore, Sears, Freund, and Green, "United States v. Macintosh-A
Symposium," 26 ILL, L. REV. 375 (1931).
6 It would seem that a promise to "support and defend the laws" would imply
a promise to do whatever was reasonably necessary and whatever Congress could constitutionally compel her to do to defend the same, i.e., to bear arms. See In re Shanin,
(D. C. Mass. 1922) 278 F. 739.
7
Rev. Stat. (1875), § 1757, 5 U. S. C. (1934), § 16.
8
The fact that civil servants are not asked whether they will bear arms does not
mean that the oath does not require arms-bearing, but only that those who administer
the oath, rightfully or wrongfully, do not make a custom of informing the oath-taker
that he is making such an implied promise when he takes his oath. No court has held
that an office-holder may take the oath if he is unwilling to promise to bear arms.
9
In naturalization cases all doubts are resolved against the petitioner, who has the
burden of showing that he possesses all the required qualifications. In re De Mayo,
(D. C. Mo. 1938) 26 F. Supp. 996; United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644,
49 S. Ct. 448 (1928).
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order and happiness of the same." 1.o The rule that, except for their disqualification for the presidency, naturalized persons have all the privileges of nativeborn citizens 11 is not violated by requiring a promise to bear arms, for the
oath has been interpreted as an oath not to volunteer but only to serve, as the
native-born must, if the law so requires.12 Further, the promise is made before
naturalization, i.e., before the alien is entitled to the privileges of citizens. Any
attempt to distinguish the principal case from the Schwimmer, Macintosh and
Bland cases 13 denying citizenship on the basis of the different grounds assigned
for refusal to take the oath 14 would seem hopeless in view of the fact that the
issue involved is merely one of whether the statute requires such an oath to be
taken. However, the principal case is, if anything, a weaker case for the applicant than the earlier cases, since here petitioner is not a religious objector 15
whose conscience will not allow her to fight for any cause or for a cause she
does not deem to be just, but a woman to whom arms-bearing is so distasteful
as compared to other war work that she seeks to induce the court to amend
the conditions of naturalization. Whether the Supreme Court will reverse itself
when the instant case is appealed is questionable, since the Court has from the
beginning of the present emergency already demonstrated its willingness in the
interest of national unity and defense to withdraw some of the protection it has
traditionally given to freedom of conscience.16 Further, the Supreme Court
10 34 Stat. L. 598 (1906), 8 U. S. C. (1934), § 382. Emphasizing the word
''behaved," the circuit court of appeals in Schwimmer v. United States, (C. C. A.
7th, 1928) 27 F. (2d) 742, said that only the "conduct'' and not the "views" of the
applicant should be considered. But it was suggested in Macintosh v. United States,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1930) 42 F. (2d) 845, that the words "well disposed" referred to the
"views" of the applicant, and that if he opposed arms-bearing, he would not be "well
disposed to the good order of the same."
11 Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9, 34 S. Ct. IO (1913).
12 See the symposium in 26 ILL. L. REv. 375 (1931). Both the naturalized person
and the native-born citizen may claim any exemption from bearing arms that the law
permits.
18 See note 1, supra. In pointing out that an oath is an unreliable way of testing
the likelihood of good citizenship, Professor Sears in the symposium in 26 ILL. L.
REv. 375 at 383, 384 (1931), observes that "only very cautious individuals with New
England consciences" are thus denied citizenship, though their sensitive consciences are
the very quality that should make them desirable citizens. For "If [they] had crossed
their fingers and had taken the oath without explaining their ideas," and regarded
the oath, as most do, as mere rigamarole, their applications would be accepted.
15 While the objections of Mrs. Schwimmer, an avowed atheist, were not religious-unless the moral beliefs of an atheist can be said to constitute a religionher objections were nonetheless "conscientious." See Justice Holmes' dissenting
opinion in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644 at 653, 49 S. Ct. 448
(1928). The Selective Service Act of 1940 exempts only if the objections to.fighting
are the result of "religious training and belief." 54 Stat. L. 889 (1940), 50 U. S.
C. A. (Supp. 1941), Appendix, 5, § 5 (g).
16 See Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 309 U. S. 645, 60 S. Ct. 609
(1940); 39 MICH. L. REv. 149 (1940); 26 CoRN. L. Q. 127 (1940); 35 TIME,
No. 24, p. 22 (June IO, 1940). It would seem difficult to predict a reversal of the
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as recently as 1938 denied certiorari of a decision denying citizenship to a
Mennonite whose religious faith forbade him from fighting under any circumstances.17 Finally, in the ten years that have elapsed since the decision of the
Macintosh case Congress has not seen fit to amend the Naturalization Act; this
indicates Congressional approval of the interpretation given to the act in that
case which the Court cannot easily ignore.18

David N. Mills

principal case in view of the fact that even Justice Stone, who, as the lone dissenter in
the Gobitis case, thus showed himself to be the most reluctant of all the justices to let
freedom of conscience be impaired in the interests of patriotism and unity, concurred
in the majority opinion in the Schwimmer case.
17 Warkentin v. Schlotfeldt, (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 42, cert. den. 304
U.S. 563, 58 S. Ct. 943 (1938).
18 See Beale v. United States, (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 737.

